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I.  INTRODUCTION 
I want to start by offering my great thanks to the members of the St. Louis 
University Law Journal for this wonderful gathering; it is such a pleasure to be 
part of the Childress program this year. And on behalf of all of us, I want to 
share thanks as well with Heather Gerken, for giving us these wonderful ideas 
to collectively chew on. While some of the particulars are chewier for me than 
others, I strongly support the central thrust of her proposal—that federalism 
theory has come to the point at which it no longer makes sense, if it ever did, to 
characterize the grand theoretical debate as one between “federalism” and 
“nationalism.”
1
 
Heather’s work represents a critical component of an emerging consensus 
among contemporary federalism theorists that the old frameworks for thinking 
about interjurisdictional governance are broken.
2
 Among her many outstanding 
contributions to the field is scholarship that draws together the energy of so 
many sub-disciplinarians from within the greater federalism discourse. In her 
work, she brings together perspectives from election law, administrative law, 
health law, immigration law, environmental law, and others—including those 
from many of us here today.
3
 Often following independent paths, many of us 
have arrived in similar theoretical territory, including our recognition that the 
federal system depends as much on interjurisdictional integration as it does on 
jurisdictional separation (and in some respects, more so).
4
 Heather is right: it is 
time for those on both sides of the state-federal turf war to consider détente. 
For me, the important question is what the terms of that détente should look 
like, and that is what I’d like to talk about today. 
Heather credits environmental federalism scholars, in particular, as early 
movers in this direction.
5
 So in my remarks today, I want to start with a few 
comments about the significance of environmental law’s position at the 
vanguard of this more dynamic understanding of federalism. I’ll note the 
increasing importance of “applied federalism” in the literature, and the special 
features of environmental governance that make it a wellspring of federalism 
controversy. Then I’ll share some important points in support of Heather’s call 
 
 1. Heather Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
997, 997–99 (2015). 
 2. See ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN xxvi−xxvii & nn.71–72 
and accompanying text (Oxford, 2014) (contrasting the canonical federalism literature and the 
challenge from dynamic federalism scholars). 
 3. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1002–07. 
 4. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 
1889, 1890 (2014); See Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution: 
Navigating the Separation of Powers both Vertically and Horizontally, COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 
(Mar. 2015) [hereinafter Ryan, Navigating the Separation of Powers] (reviewing the emerging 
literature on negotiated structural governance). 
 5. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1004. 
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for détente, emphasizing the centrality of state-federal integration in American 
federalism and the defining importance of federalism’s ends in relation to its 
means. I’ll close with a few points of constructive disagreement, addressing the 
relationship between federalism process and principle, the meaning of 
federalism and nationalism, and the principal-agent metaphor of state-federal 
relations. 
A. Lessons in Ambition and Humility 
Before I do that, though, I also want to recognize another important part of 
Heather’s contribution to the discourse, to the profession in general, and 
certainly to me personally—which is the great generosity of her mentoring. 
Her support and encouragement of other scholars to think creatively and 
ambitiously against the grain has pushed the discourse forward as much as 
anything else, and I am especially grateful for that. And with that in mind, I 
thought I’d contextualize my remarks with a Heather Gerken mentoring 
anecdote that helps set up my more substantive comments about the 
relationship between environmental and constitutional law within the overall 
federalism discourse. The story bridges two separate vignettes in which 
Heather alternatively inspired me to be ambitious and reminded me to be 
humble (both lessons that I doubtlessly needed, and each in good time!). 
My lesson in humility took place at an earlier federalism symposium that, 
like this one, honored Heather’s work. At the cocktails afterward, she shared 
an early version of the ideas that have come to fruition in her lecture today, 
because they harmonized with the insights of my own work. And indeed, I was 
very supportive of them—but perhaps insufficiently surprised. I recall 
thinking: yes, I agree that the zero-sum boxing match
6
 between the proponents 
of local and national power is a tired and ineffective way of understanding 
federalism (and I’ll say more about that later in my remarks). And yes, I 
thought; to push the discourse forward, we should focus on the ends of 
federalism rather than its means, where the ends represent the purposes of 
federalism, or the work that we want federalism to do for us in governance 
(and I’ll say more about that later, too). 
And yes—this feels very much like what I’ve been arguing for some time,
7
 
along with others from the dynamic federalism school that was already well-
 
 6. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 997 (“I came to the debate late in the game, when it had 
reached that point that Robert McCloskey so vividly described in constitutional law—when 
everyone seems like aging boxing club members who have fought so long that they know each 
other’s moves and fight mostly to tire the other out.”); see also ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE 
MODERN SUPREME COURT 291 (1972). 
 7. See RYAN, supra note 2 (analyzing federalism controversy as a “tug of war” between 
competing federalism principles, describing an “interjurisdictional gray area” in which state-
federal integration is both inevitable and appropriate, recognizing the unique contributions of 
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developed in environmental law
8
 . . . so why is it suddenly news? And it was in 
that moment, as she looked at me puzzled but patiently, that I suddenly 
understood that precious few in the pure constitutional law discourse (other 
than Heather Gerken!) had paid much attention to anything we had been 
saying. Thinking we had changed the field, perhaps we had just been echo-
chambering within our own silo. 
 
different branch actors in managing federalism, and proposing a theory of Balanced Federalism 
incorporating these insights). 
 8. See ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION: LEGAL 
STRUCTURE AND THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 9–10 (2d ed. 
2009) (discussing the cooperative federalism inherent in Congress’s passage of the Clean Water 
Act); THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
(Kalyani Robbins ed., forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author) (collecting the 
work of leading environmental federalism scholars on governance strategies and dilemmas 
throughout the field); David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case 
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1798 (2008) 
(rejecting “the traditional static optimization model” of federalism in favor of an adaptive one); 
William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and 
Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 148 n.4 (2007) (discussing the prevalence of 
cooperative federalism schemes in environmental federalism); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative 
Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2009) (arguing that iterative 
exchange between state and federal actors within environmental federalism programs encourages 
regulatory innovation); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in 
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 161 (2006) (arguing that jurisdictional overlap in 
environmental federalism is preferable to static allocations of authority to either state or federal 
actors); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 571 
(1996) (arguing for a “multitier regulatory structure that tracks the complexity and diversity of 
environmental problems”); Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action 
Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global 
Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 579–80 (2008) (developing “a framework for 
analyzing environmental ceiling preemption” and applying it to the regulation of greenhouse 
gases); Blake Hudson, Dynamic Forest Federalism, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1643, 1650 (2014) 
(providing an analysis of dual federalism control over subnational forests and arguing for a 
“greater dynamism” in U.S. forest policy); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem 
Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 190 (2002) (discussing 
the emergence of collaborative ecosystem governance); Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism 
Proposal for Climate Legislation: The Value of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENVER 
U. L. REV. 791 (2008) (arguing for a cooperative federalism approach for climate change 
regulation); Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory 
State, 92 IA. L. REV. 545 (2007) (arguing for the integration of state common law with existing 
federal and state statutes to facilitate coherence within environmental law); Hari M. Osofsky, 
Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. 
L. REV. 237 (2011) (introducing a “diagonal federalism” framework for understanding multilevel 
climate governance); Hannah Wiseman & Hari M. Osofsky, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 
72 MD. L. REV. 773, 778 (2013) (discussing the federalism-related challenges for energy 
governance). 
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Months later, after sharing a paper with Heather’s Federalism Seminar, we 
found ourselves again discussing the marginalization of environmental 
perspectives within the overall constitutional discourse. At that point, I 
wondered aloud if I should just stop writing in federalism altogether, and start 
talking to environmental scholars more likely to be interested in what I had to 
say. But in fully animated Gerken form, Heather insisted that I take the fight to 
constitutional law instead. She urged me to take on as my next article: “What 
Con Law Can Learn from Environmental Law,” modeled after her early efforts 
to school “con law” from the perspective of election law.
9
 And since it is wise 
to do what Heather Gerken advises, I thought I’d take the opportunity here to 
share a few preliminary thoughts about what constitutional law can indeed 
learn from environmental law—at least when it comes to federalism. 
II.  “WHAT CAN CON LAW LEARN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW” 
In preparing these remarks, I thought long and hard about what con law 
can learn from environmental law in general, and I actually came up with a 
pretty long list. Up at the top: more comfortable clothing! Especially footwear 
(and especially for women). Teamwork, too—since environmental law is 
interdisciplinary by nature, forcing its experts to consult other sources of 
understanding to solve “super wicked” regulatory problems.
10
 Etiquette may be 
a contender (at least if one compares the contrasting tones of the environmental 
and constitutional law professor list serves). But in all seriousness, if I were to 
choose one thing that constitutional law could truly learn from environmental 
law to make the federalism discourse more meaningful, there is a clear and 
simple choice—facts. Simple facts: simple, complicated, rich, contextualizing 
facts. 
A. Federalism As Applied 
Facts: substantive knowledge about a specific field of law and governance. 
How statutes actually work, and the way specific regulations actually fill in the 
gaps left over after statutes are enacted. And who it is that actually does 
everything to fit these pieces together and make them function in the real world 
of regulatory governance. What con law can learn from environmental law—
and alternatively, health law and immigration law, and election law and so 
 
 9. Heather K. Gerken, Keynote Address: What Election Law Has to Say to Constitutional 
Law, 44 IND. L. REV. 7 (2010). 
 10. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the 
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1157–59 (2009) (describing climate 
change as an exemplar “super wicked” regulatory problem and discussing the asymmetric design 
features necessary for functional climate change governance). 
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on—are the actual mechanics of federalism-sensitive governance.
11
 It’s from 
these realms that we understand what federalism really looks and feels like at 
the ground level. This is where we meet real American federalism—when we 
get out of the abstract plane of pure theory that Heather’s “aging boxing club 
members” have been operating in,
12
 and into the hurly burly of sweaty, 
sleeves-rolled-up efforts to manage interjurisdictional conflict and overlap. 
Had constitutional law done this before environmental law (and now other 
disciplines) had forced it to, it would have noticed long ago that its 
predominant model of state-federal relations—at least among aging boxers—is 
bankrupt. I’ve previously identified this failed metaphor as the mythology of 
“zero-sum federalism,” a traditional view of the relationship between state and 
federal power that sees the two sides as locked in a bitter and antagonistic 
struggle over the line between them, where every victory for one side 
represents a loss for the other.
13
 (And in the traditional zero-sum model, it’s 
just these two sides; the relationship doesn’t go, as Heather has provocatively 
described, “all the way down!”
14
) 
But those engaged with the facts know that this is not what American 
federalism looks like at all.
15
 Federalism does, in fact, go “all the way down,” 
involving parallel, embedded, and diagonal relationships among local, 
regional, and even international actors.
16
 And that line between state and 
federal power, if there is one, is more of an interface—a site of negotiation and 
interchange between local and national actors over how to allocate contested 
authority in contexts of legitimate jurisdictional overlap.
17
 
Indeed, the growing gap between the zero-sum model and the messy 
reality of interjurisdictional governance reveals just how far the aging boxers’ 
discourse has drifted from a meaningful relationship with the regulatory world 
we are all presumably trying to improve. In my own work on negotiated 
federalism, I’ve tried to help close the gap by exploring the complex dynamics 
 
 11. See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 24–73 (2011) 
[hereinafter Ryan, Negotiating Federalism]; RYAN, supra note 2, at 271–314 (both describing the 
mechanics of negotiated federalism in a variety of regulatory fields, including environmental 
law). 
 12. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 997–99. 
 13. RYAN, supra note 2, at 267–68; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 4–5; 
Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism Past the Zero Sum Game, 38 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 4, 4 
(2012). 
 14. Heather Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2010). 
 15. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 315–38; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 74–
102 (both reporting on the perspectives of practitioners of federalism-sensitive governance). 
 16. Osofsky, supra note 8, at 242–43; Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local 
Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 711–12 (2008). 
 17. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 265–367; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 
24–73 (both describing the full enterprise of negotiated federalism). 
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of intergovernmental relations that more fully approximate the depth and 
complexity of American federalism.
18
 I’ve identified an array of means by 
which state and federal actors compete and collaborate through different forms 
of intergovernmental bargaining that belie the bright line of separation and the 
zero-sum game.
19
 But to understand these regulatory dynamics, one has to 
keep abreast of the way regulatory systems actually work. At some point, it 
seems, a few too many armchair federalism theorists forgot the importance of 
doing that. 
Federalism is an as-applied science. It’s not enough to think in terms of 
pure theory; governance theory is tested and made meaningful only through its 
application in real contexts. Federalism theorists threaten our own relevance if 
we become too divorced from the mechanics of how federalism operates in 
specific contexts of governance. And so it is no accident that I came to my 
federalism work from a perspective grounded in the particulars of 
environmental law, and that Heather Gerken came to hers from election law, 
and Abbe Gluck from health law, and so on.
20
 We came to our various insights 
 
 18. For a model of Balanced Federalism in which the allocation of contested constitutional 
authority is mediated through various forms of balancing, compromise, and negotiation among all 
branches and levels of government, see RYAN, supra note 2, and the previous scholarship it draws 
from: Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11 (analyzing how state and federal actors 
negotiate to resolve jurisdictional uncertainty and arguing that some of this bargaining may 
qualify as legitimate constitutional interpretation); Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules in Tenth Amendment Infrastructure, 81 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral] (analyzing the 
negotiation of structural entitlements in assessing the Supreme Court’s invalidation of 
intergovernmental bargaining); Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking 
Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 507–08 (2007) 
[hereinafter Ryan, Interjurisdictional Gray Area] (exploring inevitable jurisdictional overlap and 
uncertainty between clearer realms of state and federal authority). See also Erin Ryan, The 
Spending Power and Environmental Law after Sebelius, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1003, 1008 (2014) 
(analyzing the impacts of the Supreme Court’s new spending power constraint on state-federal 
bargaining in programs of cooperative federalism); Erin Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug 
of War Within, in THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS (Kalyani Robbins ed., forthcoming 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter Ryan, 
Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within] (analyzing how environmental law showcases 
the wider conflicts in federalism theory and the structures of governance it has evolved to manage 
them); Erin Ryan, The Once and Future Challenges of American Federalism, in 1 THE WAYS OF 
FEDERALISM IN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE HORIZONS OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY IN 
SPAIN 267, 268–69 (Alberto López Basaguren & Leire Escajedo San-Epifanio eds., Springer 
2013) (analyzing developments in state-federal intergovernmental bargaining). 
 19. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 265–367; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 
24–73 (both articulating a taxonomy of ten different ways that state and federal actors negotiate 
with one another, including conventional forms of bargaining, negotiations to reallocate authority, 
and joint policymaking bargaining). 
 20. Gerken, supra note 9, at 17; Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory 
Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE 
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about interjurisdictional governance based on our rich experiences with the 
way it operates in holistic regulatory fields. In fixating on the zero-sum game, 
the aging boxers’ debate lost touch with the ever-evolving textures of 
federalism-sensitive governance in specific points of application. Federalism 
theory needs content to be meaningful. The days of armchair federalism theory 
are over because armchair federalism theory is sterile. 
B. The Canary in Federalism’s Coal Mine 
Notably, when I started writing about federalism, I didn’t know that I was 
writing in “environmental federalism;” I thought it was just “federalism.” But I 
was propelled here by some provocative environmental federalism dilemmas, 
and it’s worth considering why environmental law so regularly provides them. 
As Heather recognizes, environmental law has been at the forefront of both 
federalism controversy and innovation, although other fields of law—marriage, 
marijuana, immigration, and health law, among others—are close on its 
heels.
21
 Still, many of the Supreme Court’s most famously divisive federalism 
cases are actually environmental cases.
22
 The New York v. United States
23
 anti-
commandeering doctrine decision that commenced the Rehnquist Court’s New 
Federalism revival was actually an environmental case about interstate 
radioactive waste management.
24
 The same is true of many of the Court’s 
standing cases.
25
 So in trying to ascertain what con law can learn from 
environmental law, it may help to ask why environmental law is so often the 
canary-in-the-coal-mine of wider constitutional controversy?
26
 
 
L.J., 534, 539 (2011); Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 18, 
manuscript at 13. 
 21. Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 18, manuscript at 1 & 
nn.1–11 (listing current federalism controversies in different areas of law). 
 22. Id. manuscript at 16–20 (discussing Supreme Court environmental cases that intersect 
with federalism, including Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), Rapanos v. United States, 
547 U.S. 715 (2006), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)). 
 23. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 24. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 215–64; Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral, supra note 18, 
25–64 (both discussing New York v. United States). 
 25. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (in a case about National Forest 
management, holding that standing under the Administrative Procedure Act is available only for 
individualized injuries); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (in a case about 
mining on public lands, holding that a plaintiff must show an individualized injury within the 
specific “zone of interests” protected by the relevant environmental laws); Friends of the Earth, 
Inc., v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (allowing standing to sue a polluter even after 
the initial suit was mooted by the voluntary cessation of the polluting activity, unless the 
defendant proves that the allegedly wrong behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.). 
 26. See Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 18, manuscript at 
4 (noting that environmental federalism decisions often prove to be the “canary in federalism’s 
coal mine”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] RESPONSE TO HEATHER GERKEN’S FEDERALISM AND NATIONALISM 1155 
After pondering this question for so many years, it seems to me that the 
reason environmental law has been both a wellspring for creative 
interjurisdictional governance and a hotbed of federalism controversy is 
because it engages problems in which opposing claims to preeminently local or 
preemptively national authority are both, simultaneously, at their strongest.
27
 
For example, environmental problems often involve some kind of a land use, 
and we all know that the regulation of land use is one of the most classically 
local forms of governing authority.
28
 There are good reasons for that.
29
 But 
environmental problems also involve boundary crossing, spillover harms that 
are the classic basis for centralized regulatory authority, to protect those at risk 
for harm who are outside the local jurisdiction and unrepresented in relevant 
governance decisions.
30
 In this respect, these opposing claims for exclusively 
local or national supremacy in environmental federalism dilemmas break down 
because everybody is so right. (And as a corollary, when everybody is so right, 
the other side seems especially wrong—accounting for the extreme 
controversy that attends environmental federalism dilemmas.) But when 
everyone is equally right and wrong, what does federalism tell us to do?
31
 
III.  POINTS OF CONVERGENCE: OF MEANS AND ENDS 
This brings me to my most important point of agreement with Heather’s 
détente proposal, which is her rightful admonition that we shift our focus from 
the means of federalism (how things should work) to the ends of federalism 
(what we are working for)
32
—because it is federalism’s ends that will 
ultimately tell us how things should work in these circumstances. Indeed, this 
is the very point that I have been trying to make, though less eloquently and 
successfully than Heather, since my very first federalism law review article, 
which became the basis for my later book, Federalism and the Tug of War 
Within.
33
 In a nutshell, my argument has been that the only way to figure out 
how to allocate contested authority in a federal system is to figure out what 
 
 27. Id. manuscript at 11–20. 
 28. See Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 80 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(identifying zoning among “the most essential functions” of local government); RYAN, supra note 
2, at xii (noting that states administer local zoning laws). 
 29. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 50–59 (discussing the benefits of local autonomy in 
governance). 
 30. See id. at 145–80; Ryan, Interjurisdictional Gray Area, supra note 18, at 567–70 (both 
discussing interjurisdictional regulatory problems). 
 31. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 1030 (noting that no one among the opposing interpretive 
camps has a monopoly on truth). 
 32. Id. at 998. 
 33. RYAN, supra note 2, at xi–xii (drawing on Ryan, Interjurisdictional Gray Area, supra 
note 18). 
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will best advance the underlying values of federalism.
34
 These underlying good 
governance values tell us what federalism is for. Protecting and enhancing 
these values in governance is the purpose of federalism—the work we ask 
federalism to do for us in channeling actual government toward our 
governance ideals.
35
 They are, in other words, the ends of federalism. 
A. The Ends of Federalism 
In Federalism and the Tug of War Within, I draw from the federalism 
literature and jurisprudence to extrapolate a set of four or five core values, 
some familiar and some less so.
36
 There is the value of checks and balances 
between local and national authority, which protects individuals against 
government overreaching or abdication by either level.
37
 Ideally, federalism 
helps foster accountability and transparency in governance, enhancing 
democratic participation at all points along the jurisdictional spectrum.
38
 
Federalism fosters diversity, innovation, and interjurisdictional competition by 
protecting local autonomy
39
 while affirming central authority to resolve 
collective action problems, police spillover harms, and vindicate core 
constitutional promises of individual rights.
40
 And last but not least, though 
perhaps least recognized, is the problem-solving synergy that federalism 
enables us to harness between the distinctive capacities of different 
governmental actors—the kind of governance that can only happen, or that 
happens best, at the local, regional, state, or federal level, and among the 
various branches of government—for getting at the different parts of complex, 
interjurisdictional problems that can’t be resolved at any one level or by any 
one actor alone.
41
 Environmental law has lots of problems like this, which has 
surely shepherded my thinking along these lines.
42
 
So these values are the ends of federalism—the purposes to which 
federalism should aspire, and the touchstone for constitutional interpreters 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 34–67 (identifying four values, in which the value of central authority is partnered 
with problem-solving synergy); Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra 
note 18, manuscript at 6–9 (adding more explicit consideration of the value of centralized 
oversight as a fifth, independent value). 
 37. RYAN, supra note 2, at 39–44. 
 38. Id. at 44–50. 
 39. Id. at 50–59. 
 40. Id. at 59–66; See Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 18, 
manuscript at 6–7 (discussing the value of centralized oversight). 
 41. RYAN, supra note 2, at 59–66. 
 42. See Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 18, manuscript at 
11–20 (discussing the unique collision of federalism values in environmental law and the 
resulting interjurisdictional challenges for environmental governance). 
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when making federalism-sensitive governance decisions. The problem for 
federalism-sensitive governance, of course, is that while these are all 
individually wonderful values in and of themselves, it can be very hard to 
always satisfy all of them, all together, at the same time.
43
 There are inherent, 
inevitable tensions among them, which the jurisprudence has not always 
recognized. Some are quite obvious—for example, the open tension between 
localism and nationalism values that, in large part, animates the aging boxers’ 
debate that Heather is trying here to disband.
44
 But the network of federalism 
values are suffused with other, less obvious tensions as well—for example, 
between checks and accountability. After all, if we only cared about 
accountability, we’d do better with a single sovereign controlling a fully 
centralized system (rather than our confusing system of dual state and federal 
sovereignty), because it’s easy to know who is responsible for bad policy if 
there is only one policymaker! But we reject that model because it would 
entirely foreclose the checks and balances (and interjurisdictional synergy) for 
which we are willing to make tradeoffs against accountability values.
45
 
B. The Tug of War Within 
The problem for federalism-sensitive governance is that figuring out how 
to work through all this tension can be really, really hard. Protecting one value 
imposes costs on another, but adjusting for that creates problems for still 
another. That’s why federalism dilemmas generate so much controversy—
there are multiple, sometimes equally compelling considerations, all operating 
at once.
46
 That’s why the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence has 
vacillated so much over time—as the Court alternatively picks out one value to 
privilege and then shifts to another that the previous approach has left 
vulnerable.
47
 And for what it’s worth, this is why federalism theory is so 
important. At the end of the day, it’s all we’ve got to help us conceptualize our 
way through this particularly complex constitutional maze—which is about so 
much more than just states’ rights versus nationalism.
48
 
 
 43. Id. at 6–9; See RYAN, supra note 2, at 34–67 (discussing the fundamental federalism 
values and the inevitable tensions between them). 
 44. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 999–1001. 
 45. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 47–48 (discussing the conflict between the accountability 
value and other core federalism values). 
 46. See id. at 66–67 (discussing the conflicting federalism values of checks and balances, 
accountability and participation, local innovation and competition, and state-federal problem-
solving synergy). 
 47. See id. at 68–104 (discussing the historical pendulum swing amongst the competing 
values). 
 48. See id. at 368–72 (discussing the values competition within good federalism-sensitive 
governance and the need for federalism theory that is more sensitive to these dynamics). 
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For this reason, I have encouraged us to think about federalism less as a 
matter of the contest between states’ rights and federal power, or that between 
judicial or political safeguards, or even dueling conceptions of original 
intent—and to think about it more as our ongoing response to the inevitable 
conflicts that play out among federalism’s core principles.
49
 As noted, my own 
federalism scholarship identifies that response as one heavily mediated by 
mechanisms of governance that enable structured forms of consultation, 
competition, compromise, and other forms of joint decision-making across 
jurisdictional lines. These examples of “negotiated federalism”—some 
obvious, some less so—engage perspectives from up and down the 
jurisdictional spectrum and across the different branches of government, 
ideally to enable federalism-sensitive governance to benefit from the unique 
competency that each brings to the decision-making table.
50
 
C. Balanced Federalism 
If I had more time, I would sketch out how my own theory of Balanced 
Federalism facilitates this dynamic allocation of responsibility, capitalizing on 
the different kinds of substantive expertise, legal authority, governing 
competency, and other forms of regulatory capacity that attach to executive, 
legislative, and judicial actors at the local, state, and federal levels.
51
 The 
Balanced Federalism model splits some of the differences that provoke conflict 
in the traditional federalism debate. It is not pre-committed to preferring 
regulatory authority at either the state or the federal level, nor is it fully 
committed to either judicial or political safeguards.
52
 In arbitrating between 
these camps, the Balanced Federalism approach takes as its touchstone the 
good governance values at the heart of federalism.
53
 The right direction is the 
one that keeps us most faithful to our ability to delivery holistically on these 
values. Everything else in the administration of federalism is just the means to 
these ends. 
The details of Balanced Federalism are supportive of Heather’s vision 
here—I emphasize the value of procedural consensus in the absence of 
substantive consensus, relying on bilaterally negotiated political safeguards 
subject to limited judicial review for bargaining abuses—but they are well 
 
 49. Id. at xi. 
 50. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 265–367; see, e.g., Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 
11 (both discussing various types of intergovernmental bargaining and the different ways they 
capitalize on expertise within different levels and branches of governance). 
 51. See RYAN, supra note 2, at xxvi–xxix, 181–83, 368–72 (discussing the theoretical and 
practical implications of Balanced Federalism). 
 52. Id. at xxvi–xxvii. 
 53. Id. at 368–72. 
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developed in my book,
54
 so I’ll spend the rest of my time sharing the points on 
which she and I disagree. 
IV.  POINTS OF DIVERGENCE: FALSE DICHOTOMIES 
As is probably clear by now, there is a lot of harmony between our 
approaches. In fact, the biggest difference between the vision Heather 
articulates here and the approach I’ve taken in my own scholarship is that I 
may take it even further than she does—as evidenced by the three points that I 
raise for critique. To be fair, some of these are more quibbles than conflicts, 
and some may come down to semantics—but the vocabulary we use to talk 
about these things is important. So with that in mind, I offer these three 
suggestions for the ideas going forward. 
A. Process and Principle 
As an initial matter, the draft on which my comments were originally 
premised had asserted that this new conception of state-federal relations is 
premised on “practice, not presumptions” and “processes, not principle”
55
—
and there is clear truth in the statement. As poetic as it is, however, it may have 
been a little too glib—eliding the complex relationship between process and 
principle in federalism theory. To her credit, Heather later modified the 
relevant phrase to “practice as well as presumptions; processes as well as 
principles.”
56
 Yet because others make a similar point, I preserve my original 
observation that the “process, not principle” view of federalism threatens to 
miss a critical part of the fuller story we are all telling. 
The new wave of scholarship supporting détente is, indeed, cognizant of 
the importance of process in American federalism, especially process that 
facilitates the integration of local and national perspective in federalism-
sensitive governance.
57
 My scholarly interest in intergovernmental bargaining 
as a source of procedural safeguards places my own work squarely in the camp 
of process-oriented federalism theory.
58
 But as much as I believe that 
American federalism is largely about fluidity and exchange and process, I also 
 
 54. Id. at 339–67 (discussing the interpretative potential of qualifying intergovernmental 
bargaining). 
 55. Heather Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente? 3 (Oct. 5, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 56. Gerken, supra note 1, at 999 (“It is premised on practice as well as presumptions; 
processes as well as principles; routines as well as regulations.”). 
 57. See Gerken, supra note 4, at 1893, 1895 (discussing the importance of the interaction 
between the state and federal governments); see also Ryan, Navigating the Separation of Powers, 
supra note 4, at 22–23 (describing new federalism scholarship better probing the relationship 
between process and principle). 
 58. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 339–67 (discussing the use of governance processes as 
interpretive criteria). 
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think that it’s more than just an empty vessel.
59
 The purpose of all this process 
is to advance the ends of federalism, which I view as the principles of good 
governance that federalism is designed to yield—the federalism values I’ve 
been describing here. 
And so—as Heather’s final draft affirms—I don’t think we can divorce 
process from principles, even in the context of process-sensitive federalism 
theory. These are probably a different set of principles than the ones the aging 
boxers have been battling over (which may explain the passing assertion in the 
original draft). But in my view, we can only evaluate whether the process is 
successful by the degree to which it helps us accomplish these principles in 
governance. In the end, the job of federalism theory is to help us ensure that 
the governance processes we employ accomplish the principles we are aiming 
for in that governance. 
It may be that when this issue arises, the real sticking point is simply the 
presentation of the process-principle question as an either/or dichotomy—
when in fact, the most interesting thing about process and principle in 
federalism is the under-appreciated association between them. As I’ve shown 
in previous work, many of the federalism principles that matter most to us—
checks and balances, accountability and transparency, synergy, and so on—are, 
themselves, procedural values.
60
 For example, we often think of checks and 
balances as yielding a substantive value—the protection of individuals at the 
mercy of regulatory whim—but checks and balances inherently imply the 
process of counterbalancing political power by which that protection is 
conferred.
61
 
The same is true for the accountability value, which is essentially a 
procedural constraint for ensuring democratic participation—which is, itself, a 
process.
62
 Even local autonomy is a process value: it describes how decision-
making should take place (at the local level), rather than what the content of 
those decisions should be.
63
 And we like local autonomy, because we hope it 
will foster the additional process-principles of innovation and competition. We 
may casually think of these federalism values as substantive principles, but in 
fact, they can only be actualized procedurally. It is in this sense that observers 
are sometimes right to assert that federalism is more about process than 
principle. My friendly amendment is to point out that an even better way of 
looking at this is to understand that they are often one and the same thing. 
 
 59. See Ryan, Navigating the Separation of Powers, supra note 4, at 22–23 (arguing that 
principle, not just process, is essential to federalism). 
 60. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 347–49; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 
110–13 (both discussing the procedural constraints implied by federalism values). 
 61. RYAN, supra note 2, at 347; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 111. 
 62. RYAN, supra note 2, at xxx. 
 63. Id. 
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Indeed, the federalism discourse has overemphasized “political” 
safeguards at the expense of the more important feature distinguishing them, at 
least in the federalism context, which is the fact that they are really functioning 
as “procedural” safeguards.
64
 To this end, in Federalism and the Tug of War 
Within, and a precursor article, Negotiating Federalism, which Heather kindly 
credits for jumpstarting some of this discussion,
65
 I propose additional 
theoretical support for political federalism constraints on grounds that political 
branch bargaining can sometimes better advance the underlying principles of 
federalism by engaging the parties of interest in processes of consultation and 
compromise that advance these process-oriented values better than unilateral 
judicial or statutory decree.
66
 My proposal limits judicial review over the 
substance of negotiated federalism decisions, but it allows for judicial review 
to police for the kinds of procedural abuses that violates these principles—
appropriately focusing constitutional intervention at the points that most reflect 
these procedural constitutional values.
67
 
B. Federalism and Nationalism 
My second point of critique targets the seemingly mutually exclusive 
vocabulary of “federalism” vs. “nationalism” around which the Détente piece 
is centered.
68
 I certainly understand its progeny in Heather’s earlier work,
69
 but 
the dichotomy doesn’t resonate with me by the end of the piece. It 
inadvertently reinforces the zero-sum idea that the important divide within 
federalism theory is between advocates for states’ right and advocates for 
national power. While I understand that this is where the aging boxers’ debate 
begins, it’s important to end a piece calling for détente within the federalism 
debate with greater recognition that “federalism” is not—and never has been—
synonymous with states’ rights.
70
 And for that same reason, “federalism” in not 
 
 64. See id. at 347–56; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 110–21 (both 
describing how federalism values can operate as procedural constraints in certain contexts). 
 65. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1004 n.22; Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 
14, at 20 n.50, 21 n.58. 
 66. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 339–67; see also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 
11, at 102–35. 
 67. RYAN, supra note 2, at xxx. 
 68. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1000–01 (distinguishing the “federalism” and “nationalism” 
camps). 
 69. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 
1256, 1258–59 (2009); Gerken, supra note 4, at 1917. 
 70. See RYAN, supra note 2, at xi (arguing that federalism is not best understood as a battle 
between federal power and states’ rights but rather as a balance between competing underlying 
values). 
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in opposition to “nationalism.” Using this dualistic opposition perpetuates the 
ideological fallacy that the dynamic federalism perspective has exploded.
71
 
Of course, Heather is legitimately using this vocabulary, because it pre-
exists the conversation we are having today. Though wrongheaded, it is 
already entrenched within the discourse, and so it may be useful to bridge the 
new scholarly conversation to the old. Especially at the beginning of the piece, 
she uses this terminology in the spirit of building common ground, in order to 
lead us away from the tired old boxing match between ideological opponents. 
But as the piece progresses, I’d encourage her to help push the discourse 
forward by reconceptualizing the relationship between local and national 
power within the federal system in more accurate terms. A better way of 
talking about it, after acknowledging the terminology of the old boxing match 
that she is trying to end, is to rely more heavily on the terminology of 
devolution and centralization that she uses elsewhere in the piece.
72
 
The dynamics of devolution and centralization seem to better capture what 
she means by federalism and nationalism. Each term emphasizes a location of 
primary decision-making authority within a federal system of dual sovereignty, 
rather than misaligning them with larger and sentimentally charged 
conceptions of the federal system or nationhood itself. A federal system 
anticipates both state and federal power, both local and national decision-
making.
73
 The United States is a federal nation. Proponents of “federalism,” by 
definition, favor centralized decision-making in many contexts; otherwise they 
would be proponents of a confederal system, such as the failed Articles of 
Confederation, or secessionists.
74
 Indeed, federalism versus nationalism, while 
an accepted one, is a false dichotomy. Federalism isn’t about states’ rights or 
nationalism—it’s about good governance. Once again, it’s about the ends, the 
principles, the values of federalism that we’ve been talking about. And since 
Heather’s piece is so effective at drawing the discourse toward this new 
understanding, it would be worth further shifting away from the old, zero-sum 
vocabulary by the end of the piece, if not earlier. 
C. Principals and Agents 
My last point of critique also touches on semantics, but extends into deeper 
theoretical territory. For related reasons, the principal-agent vocabulary of the 
piece doesn’t work for me,
75
 and I encourage Heather to reconsider how she 
deploys it in this piece. Of course, her use of the principal-agent metaphor 
 
 71. Id. at xxvi–xxvii. 
 72. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 1001–07 (discussing devolution and decentralization). 
 73. RYAN, supra note 2, at 7–11. 
 74. Id. at 58–59. 
 75. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 1010 (discussing state power as the “power of the servant” 
and describing it as stemming from “a principal-agent relationship”). 
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makes perfect sense in light of her previous work, including Uncooperative 
Federalism
76
 and other landmark forays into the intricacies of local-state-
federal relations. But there are considerable problems with its role in this 
particular piece, ranging from the strategic to the substantive. 
As an initial matter, her reliance on principal-agent language here creates 
problems at the level of the communication strategy. Casting the states as 
agents of a national principal may not be the best selling point in an article 
trying to persuade the proponents of states’ rights to lay down their arms. It has 
the potential to make her call for détente seem more like a Trojan Horse, at 
least from the perspective of the aging boxers on that side of the fight! To be 
fair, the metaphor holds some important truth, reflecting the role of many 
states operating in programs of cooperative federalism within the constitutional 
ether of federal supremacy.
77
 But it may undermine Heather’s credibility as the 
ambassador of a reasonable middle ground approach, because it seems to 
reinforce the old power dynamics that other parts of her argument are 
seemingly dismantling. 
Moreover, while the metaphor accurately portrays some of the dynamics 
within cooperative federalism, it misses other elements of the relationship that 
are hugely important in the overall context of state-federal relations. For 
example, it elides one of the most important characteristics of American 
federalism more generally, which is the feature of “regulatory backstop” 
between local and national authority over history.
78
 Regulatory backstop refers 
to the way that sovereign authority on both levels is used to “backstop” one 
another’s failures in protecting individual rights or advancing overall societal 
welfare.
79
 Most famously in the civil rights context, the federal government 
backstopped failures by the states to protect the rights of women and minorities 
during the 1960s. Today, state actors are backstopping regulatory failures by 
the federal government to protect the rights of the LGBT community.
80
 
Regulatory backstop has proved a crucial feature of environmental 
federalism as well. The federal government backstopped state failures to 
protect air and water quality during the 1970s, and today, state and local 
governments are backstopping federal failures to meaningfully grapple with 
climate policy.
81
 Similar examples have arisen in countless other contexts, 
 
 76. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 69, at 1262–63, 1265. 
 77. See Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 20–37 (describing the mechanics of 
environmental programs of cooperative federalism). 
 78. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 42–43 (discussing the regulatory backstop features associated 
with checks and balances). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at xxviii–xxix; see id. at 89–91 (discussing evolutions in federalism theory at the time 
of the Civil Rights Movement). 
 81. Id. at xxvii–xxviii; see id. at 167–76 (discussing regulatory backstop in the context of 
climate governance). 
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ranging from eminent domain reform to marijuana policy to species 
protection.
82
 In these situations, the states are emphatically not acting as agents 
of the federal principal; they are acting in direct competition. So there is a big 
theoretical problem in the principal-agent account of state-federal relations. It 
misses too much of the reality in the relationship to be useful, at least as it 
stands in the piece today. 
V.  CONCLUDING PROPOSAL: THE INVERTED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP 
All that said, I’d like to close by proposing a way that the principal-agent 
vocabulary might still work—if we expand the lens. Specifically, we should 
consider how much more powerful the metaphor becomes if we include all 
applicable variations on the theme. To get closer to the reality of the state-
federal relationship, we should account not only for the principal-agent 
relationships that Heather has already identified—in which the states acts as 
agents of the federal principal—but also those instances in which the federal 
government operates as an agent of the state principal. 
Examples of this inverted principal-agent relationship may be fewer in 
number given the role of federal supremacy, but even within some programs of 
cooperative federalism, federal supremacy has been purposefully waived to 
approximate an inverted principal-agent relationship between state and federal 
actors.
83
 In environmental law, for example, both the Coastal Zone 
Management Act and the Clean Water Act create circumstances in which the 
federal government must win state approval of federal plans in an area of law 
clearly governed by federal commerce authority.
84
 Countless other statutes also 
carve out space for state leadership on issues that could have been subject to 
federal preemption, including those Abbe Gluck explained earlier today.
85
 
In other cases, federal agency to the state principle is a function of clear 
doctrinal principle. For example, under the Erie doctrine of federal civil 
procedure, federal courts apply state laws to resolve state-law based disputes 
 
 82. Id. at xxviii, 313 (eminent domain reform), 311–12 (marijuana policy), 292–94 (species 
protection). 
 83. See Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 18, manuscript at 
29–31 (discussing structural privileging of state choices in the context of water allocation, the 
Coastal Zone Management Act, and Clean Water Act). See also RYAN, supra note 2, at 295–96 
(discussing inverted federal supremacy in hydroelectric and offshore drilling licensing); id. at 
302–08 (discussing the Coastal Zone Management Act’s limited waiver of federal supremacy). 
See also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 48–50 (discussing federal licensing 
decisions); id. at 59–62 (discussing the Coastal Zone Management Act). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Abbe Gluck, Nationalism as the New Federalism (and Federalism as the New 
Nationalism): A Complementary Account (and Some Challenges) to the Nationalist School, 59 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1045 (2015). 
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that are in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.
86
 The federal government 
may also act as an agent of state law when collaborating in criminal law 
enforcement, disaster relief, and the ratification and enforcement of interstate 
compacts.
87
 Many areas of federal law implicitly rely on state law to be 
intelligible—for example, federal tax and bankruptcy laws that rely on state 
law definitions of property and family relations.
88
 The implementation and 
administration of those laws puts federal actors in the position of faithfully 
carrying out policy decisions made by separately acting state actors, wielding 
power only as the servant of the state master. 
Finally, if we move beyond the doctrinal sphere to the political, we see the 
federal government acting as an agent of state interests all the time. This 
happens whenever the states use available channels within the political process 
to persuade Congress to pass federal laws that are tailored to state interests, 
such as federal block grants, stimulus packages, and financial services 
legislation.
89
 It happens whenever they persuade federal agencies to implement 
statutes in ways that address state concerns, as took place during different 
iterations of the REAL ID Act.
90
 It happens within programs of cooperative 
federalism that are redesigned to allow states to compete directly with federal 
standards, such as the Clean Air Act’s mechanism for setting motor vehicle 
emissions.
91
 It happens whenever state and federal agents work together in the 
contexts where both sides have overlapping regulatory interests and 
obligations, in all sorts of less formal ways that nevertheless make up the 
fabric of the “hurly burly” of federalism-sensitive governance. 
 
 86. Erie R.R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 87. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 17–33 (discussing disaster relief and the federal response to 
Hurricane Katrina); id. at 215–25 (discussing state-led legislative bargaining over the Low Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Act in detail); id. at 286–87 (discussing criminal law enforcement); id. 
at 290–92 (discussing the federal ratification of interstate water and radioactive waste compacts). 
See also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 31–33 (adding more detail on state-
federal relations in criminal law enforcement). 
 88. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 111 (discussing definitional overlap between federal 
bankruptcy and state property law). 
 89. Id. at 283–84 (discussing federal stimulus and financial services reform legislation); id. 
at 289 (discussing energy independence block grants). See also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 
supra note 11, at 29–31 (adding more detail on stimulus and financial services); id. at 39 (energy 
independence block grants). 
 90. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 301–02; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 56–
58 (both discussing the REAL ID Act). 
 91. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 308–10; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 65–
69 (both discussing the Clean Air Act’s iterative federalism mechanism for setting motor vehicle 
emissions). 
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Much of the scholarly work that Heather engages looks at exactly the way 
federal lawmaking becomes a tool or agent of state priorities.
92
 Indeed, one 
political scientist recently offered a compelling account of how surprisingly 
successful states are at wielding their influence over federal lawmaking within 
the political process.
93
 If Heather expands the principle-agent metaphor to 
encompass this additional dimension, I think that would be a compelling 
addition to an already compelling body of work. 
Either way, the field is better for her work, and we should all be grateful 
for her efforts to bring this much-needed détente to the discourse. 
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